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Abstract 
The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a 
state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legit-
imized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the 
leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is 
an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While 
Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could 
be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber’s terminology, Milosevic was guided by in-
strumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial mo-
ments—Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and NATO’s bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated—to ana-
lyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological 
leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities. 
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1. Introduction 
Pol Pot and Slobodan Milosevic have orchestrated the 
perpetration of horrendous atrocities until foreign 
powers intervened to prevent them from doing so any 
further. The crimes which were perpetrated in Cambo-
dia from 1975 until 1979 only ceased when Vietnam 
deposed Pol Pot from power and the atrocities which 
were inflicted by Milosevic’s regime in Kosovo in 1999 
only stopped after NATO intervened with a large scale 
bombing campaign. In both situations the humanitari-
an motivations of the intervention are questionable 
but they likely prevented much more suffering in the 
long term (Bazyler, 1987, p. 608; Roberts, 1999, p. 
108). These situations raise important questions in re-
lation to mass atrocity prevention and the role foreign 
powers play in mitigating their occurrence. Looking at 
these case studies in comparative perspective provides 
important insights on a key factor which influences 
whether pressure from the international community is 
successful, namely the willingness of the leader to 
change its policy and stop the perpetration of atroci-
ties. There are striking similarities between the case 
studies that make for an interesting comparison. Both 
foreign powers tried to come to a peace agreement be-
fore resorting to military intervention (Bellamy, 2001; 
Burchett, 1981, pp. 148, 160) and both of the leaders 
faced much stronger forces (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, 
p. 140; Womack, 2003). However, there is also one 
crucial difference; while Milosevic eventually was will-
ing to reach a peace agreement with NATO, Pol Pot 
fought until the bitter end.  
Both cases have been studied extensively, but due 
to the extremely secretive nature of Pol Pot’s regime, 
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much less information is available on the situation in 
Cambodia, and more specifically on Pol Pot and his de-
cision making process, than there is about Milosevic and 
his rule throughout the 1990s.1 While this is undoubted-
ly reflected in the analysis below, it will be argued that 
there is sufficient knowledge to analyze what ultimately 
influenced Pol Pot’s decision making process and how 
this contributed to Pol Pot’s unwillingness to yield to 
pressure from foreign powers, most notably Vietnam.  
While the article focuses on the case studies men-
tioned above, its findings might be relevant for other 
situations in which the international community aims 
to mitigate mass atrocities. In 2005, the international 
community determined it carries the responsibility to 
protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable 
or unwilling to do so. Yet with so many attempts to 
stop mass atrocities failing miserably for a variety of 
reasons, it seems worthwhile considering why these 
leaders made such different choices when they faced 
military intervention. 
Increasingly, scholars have come to believe that the 
role the individual decision maker plays in determining 
the course of action of a particular regime deserves 
more attention (Byman & Pollack, 2001; Hagan, 2001; 
Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Hermann, Preston, Korany, & 
Shaw, 2001). When scholars analyze the individual as a 
decision making unit it is often assumed that individu-
als act on the basis of a rational consideration, even 
when this is bounded by human cognition and emo-
tions (Hanoch, 2002; McDermott, 2004b; Mercer, 
2005; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; Rosati, 2000; Simon, 
1985). This perspective, however, is unable to accom-
modate the role ideology plays in the decision making 
process (D'Avray, 2010, pp. 2, 29-31, 43-46). This is es-
pecially problematic when the causes of mass atrocities 
are analyzed since ideology plays an important role in 
motivating and instigating the atrocities (Alvarez, 
2008). Therefore, a more nuanced perspective on ra-
tionality is required. Using the work of Max Weber it is 
argued that a different perspective on rationality, 
which takes into account the role that ideology may 
play, can provide additional insights in the decision 
making process. 
Firstly, the role of dictators and ideology in motivat-
ing and instigating mass atrocity is examined. By ana-
lyzing the situations in Cambodia and the region which 
was formerly known as Yugoslavia2, it will be argued 
                                                          
1 For an overview of the academic debate regarding both case 
studies see Kiernan (2010) on Cambodia and Ramet on the 
wars that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia (2005). 
2 When I refer to “Yugoslavia” I mean the region which existed 
between 1918 and 1991 under different names. After Yugosla-
via started to fall apart, the roles of the different subregions 
becomes more important for the analysis, and therefore the 
article refers in those instances to particular regions by their 
name e.g. Serbia or Kosovo. 
that the leader plays an important role in transforming 
a situation in which atrocities may be committed, to 
one in which they are actually perpetrated, thus justify-
ing a focus on the leader when efforts are undertaken 
to bring these crimes to a halt. The section thereafter 
focuses on the role of the individual and his rationality 
in the foreign policy decision making process. The ra-
tionality of Pol Pot and Milosevic will subsequently be 
examined after which an assessment will follow on 
how this influenced their decision making process 
when Vietnam and NATO threatened to intervene. 
2. Dictators and Mass Atrocity 
There were many pre-conditions, which heighten the 
risk of mass atrocities, present in Cambodia and Yugo-
slavia. It was each of these leaders, however, that 
managed to transform these preconditions into a situa-
tion in which these crimes were actually perpetrated.  
2.1. Preconditions and the Role of the Leader 
Several authors have suggested that the most im-
portant preconditions are a non-democratic system of 
government (Fein, 1995; Krain, 2000; Regan & 
Henderson, 2002; Rummel, 1994)3, difficult life condi-
tions because of economic or political crises or war 
(Alvarez, 2001, pp. 68-71; Shaw, 2007, pp. 104-105; 
Staub, 2000, pp. 369-370; Wayne Nafziger & Auvinen, 
2002; Woolf & Hulsizer, 2005), pre-existing schisms 
among different groups in the population and a history 
of past atrocities (Harff, 2003; Kuper, 1981; Staub, 
2000, pp. 369-372).4 
A non-democratic leader has less restraints to pre-
vent him from perpetrating mass atrocities (Ezrow & 
Frantz, 2011, pp. 149-151; Kinne, 2005). He may use 
the state’s resources to influence a nation’s collective 
memory and manipulate the narrative to transform 
historical enemies into those that have contemporary 
relevance (Chirot & McCauley, 2010, pp. 64-65; 
Smeulers & Grünfeld, 2011, pp. 248-249; 265; Woolf & 
Hulsizer, 2005, pp. 106-109). In addition, he may use 
economic and political upheaval and redirect the dis-
content of the population towards particular vulnera-
ble groups (Staub, 1989, pp. 48-49; 2010, p. 174). Final-
ly, the leader may be instrumental in setting up the 
institutions which facilitate the process of perpetrating 
atrocity crimes. In this sense, the leader often plays a 
                                                          
3 While some authors argue all dictatorships are more prone to 
commit atrocities, others argue that this is more likely in weak 
regimes when they are in the process of becoming more dem-
ocratic. Most scholars agree, however, that stable democracies 
are least likely to perpetrate these crimes, making the authori-
tarian nature of a regime—regardless of whether it is weak or 
strong—an important risk factor. 
4 For an overview of the most important preconditions that 
have been identified see Harff (2003). 
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very important role in inciting and instigating mass vio-
lence. In the next two sections it will be explained how 
Pol Pot and Milosevic played such an important role in 
their respective country. 
2.2. Pol Pot in Cambodia 
Pol Pot played a crucial role in inciting and legitimizing 
the crimes that were perpetrated in Cambodia. The 
country had always been known as the “gentle land” 
but it had its own troubled history (Jones, 2006, p. 185; 
Vickery, 1984, p. 7). Cambodia was once home to the 
great Khmer speaking kingdom Ankor but it crumbled 
after the 15th century through numerous foreign inva-
sions mostly stemming from its more powerful neigh-
bors Thailand and Vietnam (Chandler, 1998, p. 12; 
Peang-Meth, 1991, p. 443). The country thereafter be-
came subject to French colonial hegemony, the repres-
sive regime of Sihanouk and eventually Pol Pot rose to 
power in the wake of heavy American bombing, an 
economic downturn and through a brutal civil war 
(Chandler, 2008; Vickery, 1984). By this time, the dis-
traught population in the countryside, which had suf-
fered disproportionately from all the hardship and felt 
exploited by the more prosperous urban population, 
were highly susceptible to the message of equality the 
Khmer Rouge brought to their homes (Hinton, 1998, p. 
363; Vickery, 1984, p. 25). 
2.2.1. Using Ideology to Legitimize the Crimes and 
Redirect Anger 
The ideology of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge was 
rooted in this history. The anti-Vietnamese sentiment 
that was propagated by the elite stemmed partly from 
the country’s historical subjugation (Chandler, 1979, p. 
413; Takei, 1998, pp. 60-62). Traditionally most of the 
Sino and Vietnamese minorities had lived in the cities 
and as soon as Pol Pot rose to power he ensured that 
the cities were emptied to avoid further foreign influ-
ence, while at the same time dispersing potential op-
position (Jackson, 1989, pp. 46-47). In addition, they 
hoped that emptying the cities would help them to im-
prove the production of rice (Jackson, 1989, p. 48). The 
Khmer Rouge lived under the mistaken assumption 
that it had been water management and rice produc-
tion which underlay the success of the Khmer nation in 
Ankorean times (Kiernan, 1996, p. 8; Straus, 2001, pp. 
54-55). Becker explains how Pol “was preoccupied with 
returning Cambodia to its rightful place as the de-
scendant of the Ankor Empire” (Becker, 1998, p. 121) 
and he is quoted as having said “If our people can build 
Ankor, they are capable of anything” (Chandler, 2008, 
p. 298). Pol Pot sought to accommodate old traditions 
and belief systems within his revolutionary ideals 
(Becker, 1998, pp. 60-61). Under his leadership the 
Khmer Rouge sought to reclaim land that was tradi-
tionally thought to be Cambodian, the Kampuchea 
Krom region, but which had been in Vietnamese hands 
since 1840 (Chandler, 2008, p. 97; Jones, 2006, p. 186).  
Pol Pot also relied heavily on the pre-existing ani-
mosity between the rural and the urban population. All 
of the country’s problems before the revolution were 
blamed on the urban classes (Edwards, 2004, pp. 59-
60; Hinton, 1998, p. 363). Pol understood whom his 
audience was and the prejudices they held, and delib-
erately directed his message to the peasants because 
he knew they were more susceptible to it than the 
bourgeoisie (Becker, 1998, p. 122). After he got into 
power the urban population came to be seen as ene-
mies of the people that needed to be crushed 
(Edwards, 2004, p. 59; Hinton, 1998, p. 363). 
Next to these preexisting cultural proclivities that 
Pol Pot used, much of the Communist ideology was in-
spired by other communist regimes, most notably Chi-
na and the Soviet Union. Pol Pot just sought to imple-
ment it more drastically and more rapidly than all the 
other regimes had done, to counter those elements 
which had prevented a perfect transition in those soci-
eties (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 320; Quinn, 1989b, pp. 219-
240). Pol Pot said he was “building socialism without a 
model”, although he recognized being inspired by the 
thought of Mao Zedong (Becker, 1998, p. 185; 
Chandler, 2008, p. 256; Morris, 1999, p. 70). In reality, 
however, he seems to have been heavily influenced by 
the Chinese and within these modern communist theo-
ries sought to accommodate traditional Cambodian an-
imosities (Becker, 1998, pp. 121-122). 
2.2.2. Institutions 
The Khmer Rouge indoctrinated mainly the young and 
impressionable through propaganda and harsh, often 
brutal, training techniques (Quinn, 1989a, pp. 237-239). 
They were seen as “a blank page”, and were sought out 
because they were pure and receptive to the ideology 
(Hinton, 1998, p. 363; Midlarsky, 2005, p. 316). In addi-
tion, Pol Pot sought out minority groups (particularly 
from the Northeast) that he knew had grievances which 
could be exploited (Quinn, 1989a, p. 236).  
He used violence against enemies from outside of 
the country, particularly the Vietnamese, while contin-
uously purging his own party ranks (Quinn, 1989b, p. 
180). Most of the latter victims were sent to detention 
centers such as Tuol Sleng prison which in fact was 
more of an extermination center than a prison 
(Fawthrop, 2005, p. 78). Much of the other violence 
against the population was perpetrated when the cities 
were emptied and throughout Pol’s reign in the com-
munes where the aim was to destroy the old society to 
create a communist utopia and destroy anyone who 
might stand in the way of this transformation (Quinn, 
1989b). In this institutional set up both victims and 
perpetrators were thus forced to accept the ideology 
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and conform to the pre-existing beliefs of the Khmer 
Rouge. Victims were forced to confess and thus con-
firm the existence of enemies in society while the per-
petrators were indoctrinated and forced to accept the 
new worldview (Fawthrop, 2005, p. 78; Quinn, 1989a, 
pp. 237-239). 
2.3. Milosevic in Yugoslavia  
Milosevic, too, used already existing preconditions to 
create a situation in which atrocities were actually 
committed. After the death of Josip Broz “Tito”, Yugo-
slavia faced an economic downturn, a political power 
vacuum emerged and the end of the Cold War eroded 
the country’s prestigious position as the head of the 
non-aligned movement, causing the population to be-
come susceptible to the message of new political lead-
ers (Fine, 2006, p. 309; Jovic, 2001, p. 101; Woodward, 
1995, pp. 15-17). Noticing how the nationalist rhetoric 
of Serbian intellectuals resonated with the population, 
Milosevic decided to use this message to expand his 
own power. In doing so he contributed to the dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia (Kollander, 2004, pp. 7-8). 
2.3.1. Using Ideology to Legitimize the Crimes and 
Redirect Anger 
During Milosevic’s reign, he used the media to 
strengthen his own support base and legitimize his pol-
icies (Brosse, 2003, p. 5). In his propaganda campaign 
the history of the Serbian nation was reinterpreted. Af-
ter Tito’s death, his legacy of brotherhood and unity 
were cast aside and replaced with a more divisive ide-
ology (Jović, 2004, pp. 101-102). A landmark moment 
in this process was the publication of the SANU memo-
randum which was leaked to the press. It used the na-
tion’s past to foster tensions between different groups 
in the population. It gave the battle of Kosovo of 1389, 
that was of mythological importance to the Serbian na-
tion, renewed relevance by drawing parallels between 
the injustice suffered by the Serbs on the battlefield 
and the manner in which the Serbian inhabitants of Ko-
sovo were being treated by the Albanian population in 
more recent decades (Kollander, 2004, p. 8; Morus, 
2007a, pp. 149-152). It also resurrected memories of 
WWII to enflame tensions between the different na-
tions and suggested that the present difficulties Serbs 
experienced were a mere continuation of their victimi-
zation during this time (Morus, 2007a, p. 150). 
There is reason to believe that the memorandum 
was created in collusion with nationalist politicians 
(Brosse, 2003, pp. 37-38). Milosevic was one of the pol-
iticians who used the rhetoric of the memorandum, 
and the outrage it sparked among the Serbian popula-
tion, to his own advantage. This became most evident 
in two speeches, in 1987 and 1989, he held at Kosovo 
Polje which were widely broadcasted in the media and 
transformed Milosevic into a unifying force and savior 
of the Serbian people, thus cementing his power within 
the party (Brosse, 2003, p. 40; Morus, 2007b, p. 9). 
During the later speech, Milosevic presented the deci-
sion to end Kosovo’s autonomy as “late justice” for 
those who had sacrificed themselves in battle 600 
years earlier (Bieber, 2002, pp. 101-102). In this man-
ner he used the already existing history and myths of 
the Serbian people to advance his own political goals. 
Serbia’s population listened, because his message res-
onated with them and because Milosevic took charge 
of their discontent and gave it a direction. He demon-
ized the other nations to unify his own. 
2.3.2. Institutions 
Milosevic armed Serbs outside of Serbia in the early 
1990s and coopted key figures in the Yugoslav army 
(JNA) (Judah, 2009, pp. 169-170). However, the JNA 
was plagued by demoralized soldiers and as discipline 
started to wane, paramilitary groups were erected to 
supplement the regular forces (Cohen, 2006, pp. 468-
469; Mueller, 2000, p. 43). Milosevic pragmatically 
formed their ranks by emptying the prisons and by re-
cruiting football hooligans and unemployed men willing 
to plunder (Alvarez, 2006, p. 9; Ron, 2000, p. 297). Mi-
losevic relied on these individuals to commit most of the 
atrocities and this arrangement conveniently also pro-
vided him with “plausible deniability” (Kaldor, 2006, pp. 
55-57; Ron, 2000, p. 293). These units were used 
throughout the wars in the early 1990s and again when 
violence erupted in Kosovo (Stewart, 2007, pp. 260-261). 
3. Ideology and the Decision Making Process 
Ideology is thus used by dictators to incite and instigate 
the crimes, but this does not mean that they actually 
believe in the message they propagate themselves. 
Some might be genuine believers while others will 
simply use it instrumentally. These distinctions howev-
er are lost in contemporary theories on the decision 
making process of individuals in the foreign policy are-
na. Foreign policy analysis does not sufficiently take 
the role that ideology plays in the decision making pro-
cess into account. 
3.1. Rationality, Ideology and Foreign Policy Decision 
Making 
Numerous factors determine the foreign policy that a 
country will pursue but several scholars have placed 
renewed emphasis on the role the individual leader 
plays (Byman & Pollack, 2001; Hermann & Hagan, 
1998; Hermann et al., 2001). Dictatorial leaders in par-
ticular wield much influence, often making them what 
Hermann et al. call a “predominant leader” (Hermann 
et al., 2001, pp. 84-85).  
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Foreign policy decision-making literature has made 
great strides in pointing out the limits of the rational 
decision making processes of these individuals. Limits 
result from the human capabilities to calculate all op-
tions rationally, stem from biases and the decision 
making process can be distorted by emotions (Marcus, 
2000; McDermott, 2004a; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; 
Renshon & Renshon, 2008; Rosati, 2000).5 Considering 
these limits, it has been argued it is more useful to 
speak of bounded rationality (Simon, 1985). 
Research on the conscious decision making process 
of individuals, nevertheless, still assumes individuals 
seek to attain particular preferences if the costs are not 
too high. The problem with this conceptualization is 
that it leaves little room for the role ideology may play. 
Ideology is not the same as a preference because it 
may cause people to behave in a certain way that actu-
ally goes against their preferences (D'Avray, 2010, pp. 
2; 29-31; 43-46). 
This oversight may be remedied by acknowledging 
that there are different kinds of rationality, as Max 
Weber has done. Weber identified four types of social 
action—action which is oriented to the behavior of 
others—two of which are rational (Weber, 1964, pp. 
113-115). The typology is composed of instrumental ra-
tional action, value rational action, action which has an 
affectual orientation and a last type of action which 
stems from “habituation or long practice” (Weber, 
1964, p. 115). What primarily separates the latter two 
types from the rational variants of social action is the 
conscious or voluntary nature of the rational variants, 
the idea that they are not done unthinkingly (Eisen, 
1978, p. 59; Swidler, 1973, p. 38). Since the focus of 
this article will be on the conscious decision making 
process of leaders, the focus here will be on the first 
two types of action. 
The first type of rationality, instrumental rationali-
ty, resembles what we commonly associate with ra-
tional action. According to Weber it is oriented to a 
“system of discrete individual ends” (1964, p. 115) and 
in the decision making process the “end means and 
secondary results are all rationally taken into account 
and weighed” (Weber, 1964, p. 117). Alternative 
means may be considered as well as the alternative 
consequences of the means used, and the relative im-
portance of different ends (Weber, 1964, p. 117). Prior-
ities may be shifted, and goals may be abandoned 
when the costs get too high (Varshney, 2003, p. 86). 
The second type of rationality is oriented to “a con-
scious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aes-
thetic, religious, or other form of behavior, entirely for 
its own sake and independently of any prospects of ex-
                                                          
5 Emotions in this sense may affect rational calculation but may 
also circumvent any rational calculations and dictate behavior 
altogether (Hanoch, 2002; Kaufman, 1999; Lobel & 
Loewenstein, 2005, p. 1050). 
ternal success” (Weber, 1964, p. 115). For the present 
research it is important to note that in situations of 
mass atrocities these beliefs are often incorporated in 
an ideology which can be seen as a system of beliefs 
(Alvarez, 2008, p. 216; D'Avray, 2010, p. 76). These 
goals, according to Weber, are pursued regardless of 
the personal costs it may entail and regardless of what 
the consequences of the course of action may be 
(Weber, 1964, pp. 116-117). The person acting out of a 
value rational orientation feels obliged to act in that 
matter to fulfill particular “demands” which he believes 
are required by “duty, honour, the pursuit of beauty, a 
religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of 
some ‘cause’ no matter in what it consists” (Weber, 
1964, p. 116). These goals will thus be pursued with in-
credible perseverance. 
These two types of action are not mutually exclu-
sive. Weber explains it is possible for a person to pur-
sue a value rational goal by instrumental rational 
means (Weber, 1964, p. 117). In addition, Weber 
points out that behavior is seldom characterized by 
merely one type of social action but the analytical 
framework may serve as ideal types6 that allow us to 
ascertain which rationality predominated for a particu-
lar individual and how this impacted their behavior. 
Considering the important role that ideology plays in 
the perpetration of mass atrocities it is worthwhile in-
vestigating how these different types of rationalities 
underlay the behavior of Pol Pot and Milosevic and 
how it impacted their behavior.7 The theory of Max 
Weber will therefore be applied to assess which ra-
tionality dominated for Pol Pot and Milosevic by ana-
lyzing the lives and decisions of Pol Pot and Milosevic 
before they were faced with foreign intervention. 
3.2. Focusing on Pol Pot and Milosevic 
Not even undemocratic leaders are able to rule alone 
completely and they always require a small band of in-
fluential elite to maintain power (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011, 
p. 82). The extent to which these confidants are able to 
shape and influence the decision making process, how-
ever, differs. In the case of Milosevic and Pol Pot, there 
is evidence that ultimately they were the ones making 
the decisions. In Cambodia, this holds true especially 
from 1976 onwards, at which point Pol had drawn all 
power to himself. Khieu Samphan, who was formally 
head of state but was actually a figurehead of Pol 
                                                          
6 These ideal types according to Weber, are a “conceptually 
pure type of rational action…which has the merit of clear un-
derstandability and lack of ambiguity” and may be useful to as-
sess “to which actual action is more or less approximated” 
(Weber, 1964, pp. 92, 117). 
7 Max Weber’s different types of rationality have earlier been 
applied to the war between Vietnam and Cambodia but from a 
cultural perspective, rather than one which focuses on the de-
cision making process of the individual (Morris, 1999). 
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(Chirot, 1994, p. 226; Short, 2004, p. 453), explains how 
the latter: 
“would listen impassively and with immense pa-
tience to detailed reports from lower-level offi-
cials…[when he] reached a conclusion which satis-
fied him, he would make his decision, which then 
became irrevocable. Afterwards he would call a 
meeting [of members of the standing committee], 
explaining the problem before them in such a way 
that, without anyone realising it, the discussion was 
oriented towards the result he desired…Then he 
would announce his decision, making it appear that 
everyone contributed to its formulation. There was 
no vote. It was stated: ‘The collectivity has decid-
ed’” (Short, 2004, p. 340). 
Milosevic likewise was prone to take all the decisions 
himself and according to Cohen “his personal views 
dictat[ed] how all important issues would be resolved” 
(Cohen, 2006, p. 452; LeBor, 2003, p. 158). A close ad-
viser of Milosevic for instance reportedly explained 
how “he practically does not need advisers…for in the 
end everything ends up as what he orders” (Cohen, 
2006, p. 452). While each leader, therefore, relied on a 
small circle of confidants for power, they were ulti-
mately in control of the most important decisions that 
needed to be taken.  
3.3. The Rationality of Pol Pot 
In order to assess what kind of rationality predominat-
ed Pol Pot’s behavior it is important to look at his life 
story leading up to the war with Vietnam. 
3.3.1. The Younger Years  
Pol Pot was born as Saloth Sar in the village Prek Sbauv 
in a family of prosperous farmers (Chandler, 1999, pp. 
7-8). During his school years, he was never really inter-
ested in politics (Chandler, 1999, p. 18; Short, 2004, p. 
42) and his first steps along the ideological path seem 
somewhat disingenuous. He was first introduced to 
Communism when he was given a scholarship to study 
radio-electricity in Paris in 1948 (Kiernan, 1996, pp. 10-
11). These were the years when the French Communist 
movement had reached the zenith of its success, Sta-
lin’s personality cult had reached its peak, the Com-
munists were victorious in China and the Korean War 
had started. As Chandler explains, Pol became a com-
munist “when it was the popular thing to do” 
(Chandler, 1999, p. 25). Pol seemed unconcerned with 
his academic career during this time. Although he en-
rolled in the classes he never completed his examina-
tions and thus lost his scholarship (Chandler, 1999, p. 
26; Short, 2004, p. 50; 82). He was preoccupied with 
the communist movement and came to believe he 
needed to devote himself to the revolution. The works 
of Marx were too complicated for him to completely 
grasp, but he came to see communism as a way for 
good to triumph over evil (Short, 2004, pp. 65-66). So-
cialism and nationalism became intertwined in the 
minds of the young Cambodians and the purpose be-
came to free Cambodia and turn it into a socialist uto-
pia (Chandler, 1999, pp. 27-31; Short, 2004, pp. 52-58). 
After his scholarship was revoked, Pol Pot decided 
to return to Cambodia to aid the revolution from there 
(Chandler, 1999, p. 40; Short, 2004, p. 82). Although in 
Cambodia Vietnamese patronage on the road to inde-
pendence was resented (Chandler, 1999, pp. 90-91), 
Pol was not vehemently anti-Vietnamese in those 
years. A former class mate remembers him stating in 
1954 that “the wheel of history” dictated that Cambo-
dians be friendly with Vietnam “which is so much 
stronger” (Chandler, 1999, p. 45).  
He returned to Cambodia having found his destiny 
and was utterly devoted to the struggle for independ-
ence and the socialist revolution (Chandler, 1999, p. 
40) but was at this point in time more pragmatic on 
how this should be obtained and acknowledged that 
the help of the Vietnamese was indispensable. 
3.3.2. Rise to Power 
After the country gained independence in 1954, Pol 
worked as a teacher to cover up his clandestine party 
work (Chandler, 1999, pp. 43-53) until he is forced to 
flee to the eastern part of the country after Sihanouk’s 
policies became more repressive. At this point in time 
he becomes a full time revolutionary (Becker, 1998, p. 
11; Chandler, 1999, p. 63). The hardships he had to en-
dure and the sacrifices he made in the next seven years 
were to harden his ideological zeal. After 1963 Pol met 
few non-believers which reinforced his self-assurance, 
his sense of destiny and his paranoia and belief that 
there were enemies undermining his plans (Chandler, 
1999, pp. 64-65).  
The prospects of winning the civil war through their 
guerilla tactics initially seemed bleak and living condi-
tions were harsh; he suffered from malaria and at times 
needed to walk for days to a new settlement (Chandler, 
1999, pp. 80-81, 89; Short, 2004, pp. 145, 172). In early 
1970s, however, the tide was turning (Chandler, 1999, p. 
85). By 1974 the communists had fought their way to 
the capital Phnom Penh and had started to create their 
communist utopia in the areas already under their con-
trol (Chandler, 1999, pp. 99-103). 
3.3.3. His Reign 
They eventually conquered Phnom Penh on April 17 
1975. Within twenty-four hours the Khmer fighters 
evacuated the city, and drove its population into the 
countryside. Thousands died of exhaustion and malnu-
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trition (Chandler, 1999, pp. 1, 103-104). Pol Pot be-
lieved their radical collectivization efforts were neces-
sary to achieve complete independence (Valentino, 
2004, p. 134). This idea of self-reliance also meant that 
although the regime maintained friendly relations with 
China and the Republic of Korea, from whom they also 
accepted foreign aid, their relationship with the coun-
try’s neighbors was hostile (Kiernan, 2001, pp. 193-
195). It was one of the primary reasons why Pol Pot 
wanted such a swift and thorough revolution. He be-
lieved that “if we run really fast, Vietnam won’t be able 
to catch us” (Short, 2004, p. 293). 
The project to reform the country had a prominent 
racial component and was oriented against minorities, 
especially the Vietnamese, and seen as part of the an-
cient struggle between Cambodia and Vietnam (Ed-
wards, 2004, p. 62; Kiernan, 2001, pp. 193-194). The 
Khmer Rouge viewed Vietnam as alien and domineer-
ing and determined to take over their country (Turley 
& Race, 1980, p. 96). Traitors were defined as “Khmer 
bodies with Vietnamese minds” that had to be elimi-
nated (Kiernan, 2001, p. 192) 
Pol Pot purged his own party from those he be-
lieved were obstructing the revolution and the victims 
included many who had been close to the leader for 
years (Becker, 1998, p. 202; Quinn, 1989b, pp. 197-
204). Pol Pot saw “a sickness in the party”, stating, “we 
cannot locate it precisely. The illness must emerge to 
be examined” but believed that enemies “have been 
entering the party continuously—perhaps only one 
person, or two people, they remain” (Chandler, 2008, 
pp. 267-268) and he sought to eliminate them all. He 
believed any disagreement to be treacherous (Chan-
dler, 2008, p. 266) and was never prepared to examine 
the feasibility of his policies, but considered any failings 
to be the work of traitors (Becker, 1998, p. 192; 201). 
In order to recreate the great nation that Cambodia 
had once been, the Khmer Rouge under the leadership 
of Pol Pot held on to a totalistic philosophy that dictat-
ed that the goals should be achieved “at all costs” 
(Jones, 2006, pp. 185-186; Kiernan, 2001, pp. 194-195; 
Valentino, 2004, p. 137). Survivors remember how the 
phrase “keeping [you] is no gain, loosing [you] is no 
loss” became common, signaling how human lives 
were considered worthless (Chandler, 1999, p. 117). 
3.3.4. Conclusion: The Value Rational Leader 
Pol Pot stumbled upon the communist ideology rather 
unintentionally but his dedication to the cause was real. 
In Paris the seeds were sown for Pol’s value rational 
orientation. However, during the early days of fighting, 
Pol was quite pragmatic and help from the Vietnamese 
Communists was seen as necessary to achieve their 
goals (Chandler, 1999, pp. 41-64, 89). In those early 
days, Pol was trying to achieve the value rational goal 
through instrumental rational means by cooperating 
with the Vietnamese. Throughout the struggle, his ide-
ological zeal seems to have hardened. He was willing to 
pursue his utopian ideals even when this meant he 
personally had to endure hardships and the chances of 
success were slim. As he grew closer to his vision of a 
better and greater Cambodia, and made sacrifices 
along the way, his dedication grew stronger and his 
behavior grew more rigid. He was less willing to com-
promise and became convinced that everything need-
ed to be done in accordance with the ideology, regard-
less of what the consequences were in terms of human 
life. He started to care less about the costs and conse-
quences; an aspect of value rational action that would 
turn out to be detrimental for Cambodian society and 
eventually his own position of power. 
3.4. The Rationality of Milosevic 
When Max Weber’s theory on the forms of rational so-
cial action is applied to the life of Milosevic a very dif-
ferent picture emerges and a much more pragmatic 
and opportunistic outlook becomes apparent. 
3.4.1. The Younger Years 
Milosevic was born on 20 August 1941 in Pozarevac 
Serbia in a region which had a loaded history because 
several important battles against the Turks were 
fought there and because it is the birthplace of the 
Chetnik resistence movement during WWII. There is no 
evidence, however, that Milosevic was particularly in-
terested in the history or in Serb nationalist traditions 
early on (Sell, 2002, pp. 11-12; 72). His mother, who 
primarily raised him after his father abandoned the 
family, was a dedicated communist (LeBor, 2003, pp. 7-
8). She has been described as ambitious, protective 
and dominant. She would push Slobodan to excel in 
school and would dress him up every day “in a fresh 
white shirt, like a junior version of the communist offi-
cial she hoped he would be” (LeBor, 2003, p. 13). He 
became serious and well-mannered although he did 
not have many friends (LeBor, 2003, p. 13; Sell, 2002, 
p. 15). A class mate remembers that “even at that time 
it was clear to me that he was absolutely devoted to 
his personal ambitions” (LeBor, 2003, p. 14). During his 
years in high school he met his future wife Mira Mar-
kovic. Although the two undoubtedly loved each other, 
the relationship had a functional element as well since 
Mira’s family was very well connected to the com-
munist elite at the time (LeBor, 2003, pp. 16-21). 
After high school he studied law at Belgrade Uni-
versity where it turned out he was a politician at heart, 
skillfully engaging in party politics (Doder & Branson, 
1999, p. 22; Sell, 2002, p. 19). During this time he 
struck up an intimate friendship with Ivan Stambolic 
and in the years after his studies, his career advanced 
rapidly because he continuously followed in the foot-
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steps of Stambolic (Doder & Branson, 1999, pp. 25-26; 
Sell, 2002, pp. 24-25).  
3.4.2. Rise to Power 
In 1984, Milosevic became the head of the Belgrade 
Communist Party as Stambolic moved up to become 
the president of the Serbian league of communists 
(LeBor, 2003, p. 58; Sell, 2002, p. 25). When two years 
later he tried to follow Stambolic as well in becoming 
the head of the Serbian Communist Party, he only 
managed to do so because Stambolic threw his weight 
behind him (Stevanovic, 2004, p. 26). Throughout his 
rise to power he seemed to adjust his political message 
to the audience he was catering for. When he dealt 
with a more progressive audience or people from the 
West, he portrayed himself as a modernizer but within 
Yugoslavia, he maintained an appearance as a staunch 
conservative that stood up for Tito’s legacy to maintain 
political support from especially the older generation 
(LeBor, 2003, pp. 66-69). This also became apparent 
when the SANU memorandum was leaked to the press. 
Stambolic outright rejected the document, but Milose-
vic started to ride the wave of nationalism, while claim-
ing to remain true to communism. He denounced the 
memorandum in closed party sessions but refrained 
from doing so publicly, thus making both the national-
ists and conservatives believe he was their ally (Doder 
& Branson, 1999, p. 42; LeBor, 2003, p. 79). Through-
out his career, Milosevic never stayed true to any par-
ticular ideology. He may have started out as a socialist 
but eventually it was his nationalist stance which 
helped to tear Yugoslavia apart (Kollander, 2004, p. 8). 
When Milosevic started to use more Serbian na-
tionalist rhetoric, fractures started to emerge in the al-
liance between Stambolic and Milosevic (LeBor, 2003, 
pp. 78-83). The final rupture occurred during the eighth 
session of the Serbian Communist Party where Milose-
vic betrayed his old friend, forcing Stambolic to step 
down after he was subjected to an extensive smear 
campaign in December 1987 (LeBor, 2003, p. 94; 
Vladisavljević, 2004, p. 196). 
After he removed Stambolic from power, Milosevic 
replaced thousands of officials with his own loyalists 
and he launched his “anti-bureaucratic revolution” 
(LeBor, 2003, p. 101; Shigeno, 2004, p. 143). Bureau-
cracy became a catch all phrase to refer to enemies 
more generally that were defined through a Serbian 
nationalist lens (Shigeno, 2004, pp. 143-144). Orga-
nized rallies were held throughout the country and the 
protestors demanded their local leadership stepped 
down (Gagnon, 1994, p. 150). In 1988 and 1989 this 
was successful in Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo 
(Gagnon, 1994, p. 150; Sell, 2002, pp. 81-83). Kosovo’s 
autonomy was subsequently abolished in 1989 and af-
ter his speech in the same year, he did not visit the re-
gion for another six years (Sell, 2002, pp. 87, 94). Mi-
losevic tried to employ similar tactics in Bosnia, Croatia 
and Slovenia but it caused a backlash; in the 1990 elec-
tions, parties which favored decentralization in Yugo-
slavia won, partly as a response to Milosevic staunch 
nationalist stance (Gagnon, 1994, pp. 150-153).  
3.4.3. His Reign 
It was widely believed Milosevic wanted to dominate 
all of Yugoslavia at this point but through his nationalist 
stance he inadvertently contributed to its downfall. Af-
ter the Slovenes and Croats walked out of what would 
be the last meeting of the League of Communists, Mi-
losevic was clearly upset when he saw his prospects of 
dominating Yugoslavia disappear (LeBor, 2003, p. 134; 
Sell, 2002, pp. 95, 104-105). Milosevic then quickly 
modified his goals; if he could not be Tito’s successor 
and dominate the entire Yugoslavia, he would extend 
Serbia and at least dominate most of the old territory 
(Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 63).  
While the war against Slovenia was brief, Milosevic 
was unwilling to let Bosnia and Croatia go since they 
had large numbers of Serbs living in their borders. The 
wars there would be brutal and last until 1995. Milose-
vic showed little concern for the plight of his nation as 
LeBor points out; “the equation was simple enough; 
war ensured political power, political power demanded 
war” (LeBor, 2003, p. 146). He also needed the crises to 
deflect attention from the consequences that were the 
result of his own mismanagement (Post, 2004, p. 185). 
Several demonstrations were organized in opposi-
tion to Milosevic’s regime in the early 1990s. Milosevic 
responded by compromising and acquiescing to some of 
their demands or by coopting the opposition leaders 
(Doder & Branson, 1999, pp. 77-79; 123-137; LeBor, 
2003, pp. 161-163; 196-199). Milosevic throughout 
showed himself capable of compromise when this would 
ensure his hold on power, an attitude that also predom-
inated when he decided to work towards peace in order 
to lift the sanctions that were imposed on his regime 
(Doder & Branson, 1999, pp. 188-189; LeBor, 2003, pp. 
219-220). As the consequences of the sanctions be-
came more burdensome for Serbian society, unrest 
among the population started to rise which Milosevic 
saw as threatening to his continuing hold on power 
(Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 176; LeBor, 2003, p. 220). 
In the following years, Milosevic would abandon 
the Serbs living outside of Serbia. According to Doder 
and Branson, Milosevic at this time “showed his true 
colors, abandoning the national dream that had once 
stirred his people when he realized that it was an im-
pediment to his rule” (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 212; 
Sell, 2002, p. 228). Milosevic stood by as the Serbs in 
the Krajina region were cleansed and did not even 
make arrangements for the thousands of refugees 
which consequently made their way into Serbia (Sell, 
2002, p. 242). He also turned his back on the Bosnian 
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Serbs; after they repeatedly failed to accept peace 
plans, Milosevic broke off political and military rela-
tions and the media in Belgrade started to demonize 
them (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 199; LeBor, 2003, pp. 
231-234). In addition, he remained passive when NATO 
started to bomb the Bosnian Serbs, and convinced 
them it had become necessary to start negotiations 
(LeBor, 2003, pp. 238-243, 262). According to Kolland-
er, “Milosevic was ultimately convinced that it was in 
his best interest to abandon the Bosnian Serbs” 
(Kollander, 2004, p. 15). 
As the Bosnian Serbs were losing territory fast, they 
succumbed to the pressure of letting Milosevic negotiate 
on their behalf but signed only reluctantly, under the 
threat of being arrested by Milosevic if they did not do 
so (LeBor, 2003, pp. 240-241; Sell, 2002, p. 254). The 
final agreement secured some of the most important 
elements for the Serbs, including the continuation of 
their name, Republica Srpska, but Milosevic also had 
made some surprising compromises, such as giving up 
Sarajevo (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 225; Sell, 2002, 
pp. 249-254). The Bosnian Serbs were discontent but 
Milosevic’s propaganda campaign worked over time to 
hail him as a great peacemaker. 
3.4.4. Conclusion: The Instrumental Rational Leader 
Milosevic acted out of an instrumental rational orienta-
tion. His behavior was oriented to obtain discrete indi-
vidual ends, namely to obtain and maintain power. The 
desire to obtain power and success was something Mi-
losevic grew up with. His mother was the first women 
who pushed him to excel and after he met Mira, she 
further stimulated his ambitions. Growing up, the most 
important relationships he had also had a functional 
element to it and he was willing to betray his best 
friend when this served his best interest. His most im-
portant motivators throughout seem to have been 
success and power, never truly being devoted to any 
ideology. He grew up in an area that was important for 
Serbia’s past but there is no evidence that this past was 
ever important for him. He was never a devoted na-
tionalist or communist. He used a different ideological 
stance for different audiences and as one former asso-
ciate explains, Milosevic “decides first what is expedi-
ent for him to believe and then he believes it” (Cohen, 
2006, p. 439). According to Weber, when an individual 
acts on the basis of instrumental rationality, the expec-
tations of others and the changing circumstances will 
be taken into account. In addition, the relative im-
portance of the different aims is considered, allowing 
the individual to shift priorities when costs become too 
high. Milosevic hoped to dominate Yugoslavia in its en-
tirety but when that was not possible, changed his 
plans to extend Serbia and rule most of it. Throughout 
he showed a willingness to compromise and shift his 
goals. 
4. The Intervention of NATO and Vietnam 
Pol Pot and Milosevic had different kinds of rationality 
predominate their decisions but the question remains 
whether, and if so how, this impacted the choices they 
made when they were confronted with the threat of 
military intervention. The two leaders stood at a crucial 
juncture in their rule when two much more powerful 
forces threatened to intervene militarily in response to 
horrendous human rights violations that their regimes 
had perpetrated in contentious border regions. In the 
next two sections it will be analyzed how the different 
types of rationality that predominantly guided the be-
havior of both of the leaders, influenced their response 
to these threats. 
4.1. Vietnam’s Intervention and Pol Pot 
The war between Cambodia and Vietnam had been 
simmering for years before a final offensive, which was to 
remove Pol Pot from power, was undertaken by Vietnam. 
Throughout their time in power, the Khmer Rouge had 
violated the territorial integrity of Vietnam on numer-
ous occasions (Burchett, 1981, pp. 145-162). By 1977 
the conflict had escalated to the point where the 
Khmer Rouge were continuously carrying out large 
scale attacks against Vietnam. It was followed in April 
1977 by a restrained counterattack on the part of the 
Vietnamese (Burchett, 1981, pp. 147-148). The Khmer 
Rouge, however, continued their attacks and refused 
to search for a peaceful resolution of the conflict 
(Burchett, 1981, p. 148).  
The situation deteriorated further in the second 
half of the year (Burchett, 1981, p. 148). The attacks of 
the Vietnamese in December 1977 were the most se-
vere to date, probably aimed at forcing Cambodia to 
come to a cease fire but Cambodia decided to break all 
diplomatic relations instead (Chandler, 1999, p. 142; 
Short, 2004, p. 377). Vietnam was surprised as the 
move made their skirmishes public and withdrew its 
troops on January 1st 1978 under the scrutinizing glare 
of the world. Cambodia saw it as a victorious moment 
but its troops had suffered many more casualties in 
comparison to the much stronger Vietnamese army. 
Convinced that Vietnam wanted to take over their 
country they began a “holy war” (Chandler, 1999, p. 
143; Short, 2004, p. 378). Pol wanted to “smash them 
so that they are completely gone from our beloved 
land” where nothing but “piles of enemy’s bones” 
would remain (Kiernan, 1996, p. 387). 
Vietnam tried to initiate once more a peaceful solu-
tion on February 5th 1978. Its three-point plan stipulat-
ed that: 
“1) An immediate end shall be put to all hostile 
military activities in the border region; the armed 
forces of each side shall be stationed within their 
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respective territories, five kilometres from the 
border. 
2) The two sides shall meet at once in Hanoi, or 
Phnom Penh, or at a place on the border, to discuss 
and conclude a treaty on mutual respect and a bor-
der treaty between the two countries. 
3) The two sides shall reach an agreement on an 
appropriate form of international guarantee and 
supervision” (cited in Burchett, 1981, p. 160). 
The Khmer Rouge never replied (Burchett, 1981, p. 
161). Had Pol accepted it, he probably would have 
been able to cling to power but he was unwilling to let 
go of the aggressive stance he had taken thus far to-
ward the Vietnamese. In the months that followed 
Cambodia took the violent initiative and committed 
gruesome crimes (Chandler, 1999, p. 143; Kiernan, 
1996, pp. 388-389).  
Pol Pot would argue that victory was inevitable as 
long as one Cambodian would be able to kill 30 Viet-
namese: 
“In terms of numbers, [each] of us must kill 30 Viet-
namese…That is to say, we lose one against 30. We 
will therefore need two million troops for 60 million 
Vietnamese. In fact, [that] will be more than 
enough…because Vietnam has only 50 million in-
habitants…and we will still have six million Cambo-
dians left. We must formulate our combat line in 
this manner in order to win victory…We absolutely 
must implement the slogan of one against 30” 
(Short, 2004, p. 387). 
By this time he was no longer concerned with the 
realistic prospects of success although he occasionally 
showed that he was aware of how gloomy prospects 
for victory were. At one meeting in August he said “We 
can hold on for a certain time…but if the present 
situation continues, it will become impossible. We can 
now afford to sustain only partial losses. If things go on 
as they are, we will face the risk of collapse.” (Short, 
2004, p. 388). 
Early in January 1979 the Khmer Rouge were de-
feated and Pol Pot had to flee (Chandler, 1999, pp. 
156-157). The final offensive made Vietnam a pariah 
state in the international community. China even 
launched a brief attack on Vietnam as a punishment for 
the invasion (Gordon, 1986-1987, p. 66; 71). Even 
though China had been unwilling to send a delegation 
of “volunteers” to Cambodia, it had given material 
support to the Khmer Rouge and was an ally of the re-
gime (Chandler, 1999, p. 153; Gordon, 1986–1987, p. 
69). When Pol Pot had to abandon Phnom Penh he be-
lieved he would manage to return to power, convinced 
the Vietnamese would perish in “a volcano of national 
indignation” (Short, 2004, p. 397). In these final mo-
ments he was remaining hopeful against his better 
judgment (Short, 2004, p. 397). 
The goals that Pol Pot pursued, realizing his socialist 
utopia and safeguarding the country from Vietnamese 
domination were sacred and no compromises were 
possible, regardless of the costs this would entail for 
him personally. It is certainly possible to overestimate 
the psychological roots of the conflict over the geopo-
litical and economic factors but the hatred and deter-
mination of Pol Pot seems to have greatly exasperated 
the crisis (Chandler, 1999, p. 133). 
4.2. NATO’s Intervention and Milosevic 
Like the war between Vietnam and Cambodia, the con-
flict in Kosovo had been brewing for years. Kosovo was 
never a primary concern for either the US or the Euro-
pean countries as long as the conflict did not escalate. 
At the same time, however, they feared that the situa-
tion could become highly destabilizing for the region if 
violence would spiral out of control (Daalder & 
O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 1, 9). The Bush administration, 
therefore, warned Milosevic already in 1992 that ag-
gression against the Albanian Kosovars would lead to 
military intervention on the part of the US, in what was 
to become known as the Christmas warning. The Clin-
ton administration would reaffirm the commitment of 
the US in 1993 (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 9) but 
when Serbian violence against the Kosovar Albanians 
ensued, they did not follow through (Daalder & 
O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 189). After Dayton, Washington felt 
it had lost its leverage over Milosevic as they feared 
taking a stance might endanger the fragile peace in 
Bosnia. If they had made a credible early threat of mili-
tary action or sanctions, some argue it could have 
caused Milosevic to concede to NATO’s demands, but 
the international community felt too reliant on Bel-
grade for the successful implementation of the Dayton 
accords (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 184-188).  
In October 1998 Holbrooke, US’ special envoy to 
the Balkans, managed to negotiate an agreement with 
Milosevic in which the latter consented to withdraw his 
troops and allow international monitors in the area 
(LeBor, 2003, pp. 281-282). It dampened the humani-
tarian disaster as it allowed humanitarian assistance in-
to the region and permitted refugees to return during 
the harsh Balkan winter, but the agreement did not re-
solve the conflict and key details were ill defined and 
held in check by unarmed monitors (Daalder & 
O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 23; 59-62). The agreement was 
forged with Milosevic through a combination of threats 
and promises it would stave off more forceful military 
intervention (Crawford, 2001–02, p. 510; Daalder & 
O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 47). The alliance, however, had no 
hold over the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and when 
they exploited the “shift in balance” as Milosevic had 
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expected, the latter started Operation Horseshoe that 
sought to have a broad region—shaped like a horse-
shoe—emptied of its Albanian inhabitants (Daalder & 
O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 58-59). The massacre at the village 
Racak became the symbol of the breakdown of the 
Holbrooke agreement (Roberts, 1999, p. 113). 
At that time Milosevic did not take the prospect of 
NATO bombing very seriously (LeBor, 2003, p. 286). He 
was unsure whether it would happen at all, given the 
division among the NATO countries, but believed that 
even if NATO would actually bomb Serbia, his regime 
could withstand it and that it could possibly even boost 
his domestic support when Serbia’s citizens rallied 
around the flag (LeBor, 2003, p. 287). After not follow-
ing through when Milosevic violated the Christmas 
warning, once again NATO failed to act on the threat 
that bombing would occur if Milosevic did not comply 
with the cease fire. It was a pre-existing trend. 
Throughout the Yugoslav wars, threats had not been 
followed up with actions (Kaldor, 2006, pp. 64-66) and, 
Milosevic reckoned that a bombing campaign, if it 
would commence, would be “polite” (LeBor, 2003, pp. 
286-287). 
This was reflected in Milosevic’ attitude during the 
Rambouillet negotiations that followed. He sent a low 
level delegation that was preoccupied with drinking 
heavily and singing patriotic songs (Daalder & 
O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 79). When, however, the Serbs fi-
nally did seem serious in their effort to negotiate, the 
negotiators violated their own ground rules by amend-
ing the draft agreement at Serbian request (Daalder & 
O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 81). It is likely this once more rein-
forced Milosevic’ belief that NATO’s ultimatums should 
be taken with a grain of salt and this was exacerbated 
by the fact that ground forces were openly ruled out 
(Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 189-190). 
NATO’s bombings were eventually caused by the 
refusal of Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet Agreement. 
He feared that this would endanger his continued rule 
as signing the Agreement would mean that he would 
have largely given up Serbian hegemony in the area 
and there was no support among the population for 
such a decision (Hosmer, 2001, p. xii). He expected to 
be bombed as a result of it, but believed it would be 
brief and mild. He figured that the fragile alliance in 
NATO would not hold up when he showed that bombing 
would actually be counterproductive, that it would not 
stop the atrocities and he decided to increase the level 
of violence (Hosmer, 2001, p. xii). He, however, was 
wrong. NATO’s determination actually hardened as the 
violence increased and, after initially rallying around the 
flag, it was the backing of his own support base that 
waned (Hosmer, 2001, pp. xiii-xiv). Milosevic started 
fearing for his own position and eventually became will-
ing to negotiate when he believed NATO was prepared 
to execute more severe bombing raids, launch ground 
troops and when he realized Russia became less willing 
to protect the country diplomatically (Daalder & 
O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 5; Hosmer, 2001, pp. xiii-xxiv). 
Milosevic was willing to settle because it allowed 
him to maintain what was most important to him; 
power. What Milosevic did to the best of his capabili-
ties is to calculate what was in his own best interest to 
do. He tried to take the ends, the means and the sec-
ondary results rationally into account and weigh them, 
indicating he acted on the basis of instrumental ration-
ality. He thought about the alternative means to the 
end but miscalculated when he thought that increased 
ethnic cleansing would demoralize NATO. When think-
ing of the relationship between the end and the sec-
ondary consequences, he found that the risk for 
ground troops had become too high and finally decided 
that, as he was thinking of the relative importance of 
the different possible ends, power was more important 
to him than winning the war over Kosovo. 
5. Conclusion 
Often when atrocities are perpetrated, the dictator 
plays a crucial role in creating the environment in 
which these crimes become possible. He incites and le-
gitimizes them and sets up the institutional structure 
that is necessary for their perpetration. The leader 
therefore should be an important element in strategies 
to prevent such crimes. Not every leader, however, is 
alike. While ideology almost always plays an important 
part in this process, not every dictator wholeheartedly 
believes in the ideology he propagates. The extent to 
which he is truly committed to the ideology, impacts 
the leader’s responsiveness because a different type of 
rationality may actually be dominating his behavior 
than the (bounded) instrumental rationality, which is 
usually assumed to determine his reaction. 
History has often shown that the creation of a uto-
pia for a country may result in horrifying atrocities that 
are difficult to stop or prevent. Some goals are too im-
portant to sell out, leading to a total disregard of for-
eign policy threats to stop the crimes that are deemed 
necessary by the dictator for realizing the all-important 
goal. This should not be interpreted unequivocally as 
irrational behavior. A dictator that acts out of a value 
rational orientation will be more inclined to disregard 
the consequences of his policies. He will follow a 
course of action because he believes it to be the right 
thing to do, taking for granted any costs that may fol-
low. In this manner the type of rationality that under-
lies the behavior of a dictatorial leader may be an im-
portant element in determining the responsiveness of 
a dictator to foreign policy measures. 
The debate about rationality in international poli-
tics should move beyond cognitive limitations on ra-
tional behavior to also consider differences in the kind 
of rationality that dominates a person’s behavior. We-
ber’s different types of rationality could help to nuance 
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and understand the relationship between rationality 
and foreign policy by not only placing a focus on cogni-
tive limitations but also on the role ideology plays in ra-
tional behavior. 
The instrumental rational leader will be more calcu-
lating and thus more receptive to foreign policy incen-
tives or disincentives from other countries. Neverthe-
less, this does not mean that his behavior will conform 
to what can be considered objectively as the most 
beneficial course of action for him. Human errors and 
cognitive limitations remain important limitations to 
rational considerations. It is therefore important for 
the third party to send unison messages that leave lit-
tle room for misinterpretation. 
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